

Strategy and Game Theory: Practice Exercises with Answers,

by Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez, Springer-Verlag, 2019

Errata in Second Edition, Reprint, November 2020

Updated on October 11th, 2022

Chapter 2 – Pure strategy Nash equilibrium and simultaneous-move games with complete information

- Page 5, figure 1.4. The payoff in cell (L, aar) at the bottom of the matrix, second column, should read 0, 0; rather than 10, 0.

Chapter 3 – Mixed strategies, strictly competitive games, and correlated equilibria

- Page 115. The sentence “Therefore, we found the first msNE...” should be replaced with “However, the strategy profile $p_1=p_2=1/2$ for player 1 and $q=1/3$ for player 2 cannot be supported as a msNE because player 1’s expected payoff is

$$\frac{1}{2}\left(3\frac{1}{3} + 1\frac{2}{3}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\left(1\frac{1}{3} + 2\frac{2}{3}\right) = \frac{5}{3}$$

which is lower than playing B in pure strategies (with 100% probability), which yields an expected payoff of 2. Therefore, the strategy profile $p_1=p_2=1/2$ for player 1 and $q=1/3$ for player 2 cannot be sustained as a msNE.”

Chapter 5 – Applications to industrial organization

- Page 250, figure 5.14 should read “Quantities” rather than “Quatities” in both the bottom row and right-hand column.

Chapter 7 – Simultaneous-move games with incomplete information

- Page 332, table 7.3, second row. Payoff -1 (second element in the left column) should not be underlined and bolded.

Chapter 11 – More advanced signaling games

- Page 520. The second reference should read “Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., and Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation...”